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Hardin: Pseudoscience

Pseudoscience

C. L. Hardin
The problem
Case A: Julius Robert Mayer, a physician, published in 1842 a paper
entitled "Remarks on the Forces oflnorganic Nature" in which he advanced the thesis which we would now describe as the law of the conservation of energy, complete with the description of a procedure for
obtaining the mechanical equivalent of heat. Overall, the paper was
not experimental in tone, and its argument was more metaphysical than
mathematical. It was only after the experimental work ofJames Prescott
Joule that Mayer's work came to be recognized and esteemed. But that
was a generation later. In the meantime, Mayer went mad. His
psychiatrist noted that "the patient suffers from the delusion that he
has discovered a fundamental law of nature but no one will listen.'' 1
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Case }(: Wilhelm Reich, a psychoanalyst, published in 1948 a book
entitled The Cancer Biopathy in which he advanced the thesis that there
exists a hitherto unknown force, orgone, which permeates all of nature .
Not only is orgone the concrete basis of Freud's libido, it is at the root
of a wide variety of natural phenomena from the blueness of the sky
to the formation of single-cell organisms. With the discovery of the
orgone energy accumulator, it became possible to harness orgone energy
for therapeutic purposes, especially for the treatment of cancer in its
early stages . In 1954 the Food and Drug Administration obtained an
injunction against Reich to prevent interstate shipping of orgone energy
accumulators and all literature mentioning orgone energy. Reich ignored the injunction and was given a two-year prison sentence. In 1956
the well-known artist William Steig said in a letter to Time, "Reich's
great findings are factual, demonstrable, irrefutable, as were those of
Galileo. How much longer will it be before officials, the press, the public
shake off their apathy, accept the largess of orgonomy, and fight to
defend it?" Wilhelm Reich died in prison. 2
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Case B: Meteorologist and geophysicist Alfred Wegener advanced, in
1912, a theory that the present continents are the products of a breakup
of a protocontinent, Pangaea. The continents continue to drift apart,
propelled by tides in the earth's crust. Wegener's theory gave accounts
of mountain building and the similarity of biological species and
geological formations at widely separated parts of the earth which were
entirely different from the accounts of those things universally accepted
by geologists. As a petroleum geologist is reported to have said in 1928,
''If we are to believe Wegener's hypothesis, we must forget everything
that has been learned in the past 70 years and start all over again .'' 3
In his treatise, The Earth, Harold Jeffries demonstrated that if the tidal
force were strong enough to shift the continents westward, it would
also be strong enough to halt the earth's rotation within a year. Additional compelling arguments were advanced against Wegener's views,
and he was accused of selecting for presentation only those facts which
would favor his hypothesis; he "played a game in which there are no
restrictive rules and no sharply drawn code of conduct.'' Bur a short
time later, Alexander du Toit and Arthur Holmes were able to show
that a more plausible set of mechanisms would save Wegener's
hypothesis, and they introduced several other pieces of evidence in its
favor. Subsequently, the hypothesis of continental drift became the
foundation stone of contemporary geological theory .
Case I(: Psychiatrist Immanuel Velikovsky propounded, in 1950, a
theory that in historical times Venus was ejected from Jupiter and had
several near collisions with the earth, producing a series of catastrophic
events. Velikovsky's theory accounted for stories of great floods, abnormally long periods of darkness, infestations, and the like which are
found in widely separated cultures around the earth, along with a variety
of geological and astrophysical phenomena explained quite differently
by received theories. In "An Analysis of 'Worlds in Collision,"' Carl
Sagan argued in detail that the series of cosmic events which Velikovsky specified is incompatible with Newtonian mechanics. And according to Martin Gardner, "He invents electro-magnetic forces capable
of doing precisely what he wants them to do. There is no scientific basis
whatever for the powers of these forces.'' Furthermore, he is accused
of selectively manipulating historical materials. Overall, "Velikovsky's
theories . . . are no more than rationalizations of previously held
beliefs. " 4 Subsequently, Velikovsky attracted a number of engineers
and scientists to his cause. In a series of publications, they have suggested mechanisms which, they claim, meet the objections of Sagan
and others and have adduced new evidence to support at least modified
versions of Velikovsky's theories .'
Case C: Happenings in the heavens had long been supposed to be causes
or signs of human events. Comets were supposed to portend disaster,
and people frequently claimed to see severed heads and fiery swords
in them . Edmund Halley analyzed the elements of the orbit of the great
comet of 1682 according to Newtonian principles and correctly predicted
its return . Comets thus came to be seen as natural objects whose behavior
is indifferent to human weal or woe. In a comparable effort to rid the
heavens of the objects of superstitious awe the French Academy of
Sciences, late in the eighteenth century, proclaimed as erroneous the
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2. Martin Gardner , Fads and Fallacies
in the Name of Science (New York:
Dover, 1957) , pp. 250 - 62. Gardner's
book, a skeptical classic, is delightful
if sometimes opinionated and dared.
See also Peter Marin, "What Was
Reich's Secret1 " Psychology Today ,
September 1982, 56- 65.

3. This quote and the one below are
from A. Hallam , " Alfred Wegener
and the Hypothesis of Continental
Drift ," Scientific American, February
1955 , 88 - 97.

4. Gardner, Fads and Fallacies, p. 33.

5. For the arguments against Velikovsky , see Donald Goldsmith, ed.,
Scientzsts Confront Velikovsky (New
York: Norton, 1977). Defending
Velikovsky is C. ). Ransom , The Age
of Velikovsky (New York: Dell , 1976).
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6. Gardner, Fads and Fallacies, p. 9.

folk belief that stones had been seen to fall from the sky_ Such a view
must be based on illusion or deception, reasoned the members of the
Academy, since there were no stones in the sky to begin with. In the
interest of spreading enlightenment and not wishing to contravene the
authority of the leading llghts of the scientific world, several provincial
museums disposed of their collections of meteorites. 6

7. "Objections to Astrology: A State-

Case c': ''Those who wish to believe in astrology should realize that
there is no scientific foundation for its tenets . ... It is simply a mistake
to imagine that the forces exerted by stars and planets at the moment
of birth can in any way shape our futures . . . . We are especially
disturbed by the continued uncritical dissemination of astrological
charts, forecasts, and horoscopes by the media and by otherwise
reputable newspapers, magazines, and book publishers. This can only
contribute to the growth of irrationalism and obscurantism.'' So reads,
_in part, a statement entitled ''Objections to Astrology'' and signed by
186leading scientists, among them 18 Nobel laureates. It is worth noting
that there is evidence that few of the 18 have ever studied astrology
or seen publications of the Biometeorological Research Center in which
are investigated ''correlations between organic and unorganic processes
and lunar, solar, planetary parameters," or examined the correlations
between the ascendance of Mars and unusual success in sports which
have been uncovered by Michel Gauquelin. 7

ment by 186 Leading Scientists ," in
Patrick Grim, ed., Phtlosophy of
Science and the Occult (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1982),
pp. 14- 18. The Grim anthology has
several useful papers. Its section on
astrology is particularly good. See Paul
Feyerabend, "The Strange Case of
Astrology," pp. 19- 23, and Michel
Gauquelin, "Spheres of Influence ,"
pp. 33-46.

8. These reflections will touch on , but
not discuss in detail, a very important
set of questions raised by cases A, B,
and C taken by themselves: Why do
scientists sometimes reject novel and
valuable scientific ideas? What
features of the practice and institutionalization of science promote or
discourage radical and original thinking on the part of those within the
scientific establishment' Would efforts
to promote unorthodox views within
science compromise other important
aims of science? These questions are
being actively discussed elsewhere.
See, e.g., Bernard Barber, "Resistance
by Scientists to Scientific Discovery ,"
Science, I September 1961, 596- 602,
or various issues of Social Studies of
Science, a British publication.
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M

ost scientifically educated readers will, despite the obvious
(and intended) similarities of presentation between each case
and its mate, view cases A, B, and Cas lamentable instances
of the rejection of correct knowledge claims but see K, B', and c' as
involving justifiable rejections of erroneous assertions. Many of them
will label the first set of rejected claims "scientific" and the second
set, "pseudoscientific." In using the term "pseudoscience" one has
in mind science-like undertakings which are somehow disreputable. But
what should we understand "science-like undertakings" to be? And
in what way are they disreputable?
In what follows, I shall try to clarify these matters by focusing on
some activities at or beyond the fringe of accepted scientific endeavors
and on the attitudes which scientists do or should take toward them.
I shall suggest that although there are plenty of cases which merit such
a label as ''pseudoscientific,'' one should not expect to be able to draw
a line between these and "scientific" activities which is both precise
and useful. There will be borderline cases and, with them, allegations
that in such cases science as it is now practiced is overlooking or rejecting theories or areas of investigation of great potential value primarily
because of deeply held prejudices. I shall conclude by offering a few
reflections on such allegations. 8

A distinction and its difficulties
One problem I find with the division between science and pseudoscience as it is casually and commonly made, is that it lumps together
under the label ''pseudoscience'' a number of things that ought to be
distinguished. In addition to astrology, orgone theory, and Velikovskianism, all of the following have been called "pseudoscientific":
parapsychology (the study of extrasensory perception and psychokinesis) ,
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faith healing, phrenology, the study ofUFOs, magic, investigations of
"Bigfoot," the ancient astronaut theory, Jensen's accounts of race and
intelligence, mesmerism, Atlantis theories, dowsing, and psychoanalysis.
This list, which is far from complete, is remarkable for its heterogeneity. It contains theories (the ancient astronaut theory, Jensen's accounts,
Atlantis theories) and practices (faith healing, magic, dowsing) as well
as studies of phenomena or putative phenom{na (UFOs, Bigfoot, parapsychology) and theory-practice combinations in which the practice arises
with the theory (mesmerism, psychoanalysis, and phrenology). It is plain
that one can study phenomena, or even putative phenomena, scientifically. There obviously are such things as UFOs; remember that the
term means ''unidentified flying objects'' and not ''mysterious alien
spacecraft.'' There may or may not be creatures answering to some of
the more bizarre Bigfoot descriptions, but this is certainly a straightforward minter for scientific inquiry. In a similar fashion, it is fully appropriate to undertake a scientific study of whether or not there exist
means of communication between human beings when all of the known
sensory channels for communication are blocked. One might regard any
or all of these investigations as unlikely to yield useful information or
hold that the investigators are employing deficient methods, but those
are different considerations, and represent objections that could be
leveled against a wide variety of work in, say, psychology or medical
research.9 Similar remarks might be made about such practices as
dowsing and faith healing. (I distinguish them from mesmerism and
psychoanalysis because the practitioners of dowsing, for instance, rarely
give more than brief, vague theoretical accounts of what they are doing.) Both practices have been competently studied, with the conclusion drawn that both are efficacious under certain circumstances,
although usually not for the reasons their practitioners normally give.IO
Magic (by which I do not mean stage conjuring) is a special case.
I include it here as representative of a whole body of lore often labeled
"occult." Under this denomination one finds numerology, theosophy,
spiritualism, necromancy, and the like, along with certain versions of
such subjects as astrology, parapsychology, and alchemy. The occultists
I have in mind see themselves as adepts in transempirical arts which
are beyond scientific understanding, although, they often maintain,
validated by recent findings in science . Such theories as they can muster
(and they muster them for tens of thousands of pages) are typically
garbled and debased versions of what were, from late antiquity to the
Renaissance, serious attempts at science and philosophy. Unlike their
ancestors, contemporary occultists make dreary reading even for the
historian. Since their proponents do not take these theories to be scientific (in the sense in which, say, Velikovsky does suppose his theories
to be scientific), and since the theories are explanations only in the dimmest subjective sense of the term, we should abstain from attaching
the label ''pseudoscientific'' to them. Nonetheless, the practice of magic
can certainly be-and has been-an object of serious scientific study.
I shall lump theory-practice combinations such as psychoanalysis and
mesmerism together with theories but will remark that their practice,
like that of dowsing or faith healing, may contain elements that are
sound but not for the reasons propounded in the accompanying theory.
This we know to be true of mesmerism: While we no longer speak of
''animal magnetism,'' we do give credence to hypnotic phenomena,
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9. Researchers in human sciences will
be able to supply their own examples.
For a few simple illustrations, see
E. Bright Wilson, An Introduction to
Scientific Research (New York:
McGraw-Hill , 1952) , esp. chap. 4,
''The Design of Experiments.''
10. For faith healing, see William
Nolen, "Psychic Healing," in George
Abell and Barry Singer, eds., Science
and the Paranormal (New York:
Scribner, 1981), pp. 185-95. Abell
and Singer's anthology is excellent.
For dowsing , see E. Z. Vogt and Ray
Hyman , Water Witching USA
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1959).
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even though our theoretical accounts of them are glaringly inadequate.

W
11. Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge
and Sociological Theory (London :
Rutledge & Kegan Paul , 1974), p.
134.
12. Roger Cooter, " The Conservatism
of 'Pseudoscience,"' in Grim, Science
and the Occult, pp. 130-43.

13 . Barber, " Resistance by Scientists, "
599.
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hat I have so far said suggests that the term ''pseudoscience''
should properly be applied, if at all, only to certain
theories. Even here, however, there are substantial difficulties. The first is that "pseudoscience" has often been used abusively,
not just descriptively. A prime example of this concerns Jensen's attempt to establish statistical correlations between race and intelligence.
Flawed though they may be, Jensen's studies are not conspicuously more
defective than many other researches in the field of human capabilities.
His critics have sometimes described his work as pseudoscientific not
only because the premises do not adequately support the conclusion
but also because the conclusion is, in the eyes of Jensen's detractors,
socially, politically, or ethically unpalatable. 11 It is interesting to see
that much the same thing happened to phrenology in the early nineteenth century. According to a recent study, a great deal of the controversy about phrenology was rooted in social and political interests. 12
All things considered, the theoretical and evidentiary basis in favor of
phrenology in about 1830 was almost as strong as the arguments against
it, but this did not prevent its being called unscientific by its opponents.
Evidence against it steadily mounted, however, so that it did become
unreasonable to adhere to phrenology after 1850. This illustrates a second point, which is perhaps more important than the first : In some
cases, a theory defended at one time counts as science, but when it is
defended at a later time, he who defends it will be thought a crank.
Fifteenth-century geocentrism was not cranky, but twentieth-century
geocentrism is.
A third consideration is the importance of distinguishing pseudoscience from science which happens to be false. The scientific landscape
is littered with discarded theories-geological catastrophism, the
phlogiston theory of combustion, the conditioned-reflex theory of
learning-which nevertheless occupy a place of honor in the subject's
history. Although they are false scientific theories, we do not now
characterize them as pseudoscientific theories. One reason-and this
returns to the first point-is that we do not wish to dishonor them or
men like Priestley and Pavlov who held them. Second, we believe that
they were worth investigating, competently constructed, and served to
advance the field. This is a more objective reason than the first, although
it does not explain our withholding the label "pseudoscience" from
the mediocre ephemera of orthodox practitioners. The crucial point
seems to be that a theory is called "pseudoscientific" when it is
judged to be constructed defectively as compared with the standards
of argument, theory construction, and state of knowledge at the time
it is advanced and is sufficiently unorthodox and publicly visible to attract the ire of established scientists. If the incompetence of the theorizer
is particularly marked, the public visibility criterion need not be satisfied.
The catch in all this is that a sufficiently unorthodox theory, later vindicated, may challenge the standards of argument prevailing at the time,
or the standards of theory construction, or the accepted state of
knowledge. To give an example of each: Mendel's work languished for
many years partly because it introduced mathematical argument into
biology at a time when even the most sophisticated scientists in the
field had no knowledge of or interest in mathematics.l3 Newton's
5
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Principia was resisted on the European continent for nearly a hundred
years because Newton seemed to base his theory of gravitation on action at a distance, and that flew in the face of the reforms which Cartesian mechanics had brought to explanation in physics. 14 Finally, Darwin, in advancing a theory of evolution which required hundreds of
millions of years to produce the human race, ran afoul of what appeared
to be some hard facts of physics. As Lord Kelvin argued-this was before
radioactivity was understood-given the rate at which the sun must be
consuming its fuel and the rate at which the earth must be cooling,
the earth could not be older than 24 million years. 15

S

o far I have argued that any phenomenon (or supposed
phenomenon) or practice can be a proper object of scientific study,
so that a theory or hypothesis cannot be labeled "pseudoscientific" simply because of its subject matter. Occult subjects should not
be dubbed pseudoscientific either, since they commonly make no
pretense to being scientific in the first place. Even when applied to purportedly scientific theories, the word ''pseudoscience'' is often used pejoratively for extrascientific reasons . The best reason for calling a theory
pseudoscientific is that it is incompetently drawn compared with the
standard practice of its time and the rigor of disciplinary expectations-it
commits scientific malpractice, so to speak. The trouble with this is that
to assess malpractice requires time, expertise, and good judgment. The
combination of these qualities is never in long supply. That makes it
tempting to look for a ''quick fix'' -some test or set of tests which those
theories we would like to call scientific will pass, but which will be
failed by those theories most of us would want to call
''pseudoscientific.''

14. A. R. Hall, The Scientific Revofu.
tion, 1500- 1800 (Boston: Beacon,
1956), p. 274 .

15 . Loren Eiseley, Darwin 's Century
(New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp.
238- 41.

A criterion of demarcation
As one might have suspected, no criteria have yet appeared that would
draw a border around science quite so neatly. The most celebrated candidate was first advanced by Karl Popper. It is the criterion of falsifiability, which says that "statements or systems of statements, in order to
be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible,
or conceivable, observations." 16 Sir Karl tells us that he first formulated the criterion as a way of putting his finger on what was wrong
with Marxism, psychoanalysis, and Adler's individual psychology. "Why
are they so different from physical theories, from Newton's theory, and
especially from the theory of relativity?" The problem with the former
theories is that they seem to be confirmed by everything .
I may illustrate this by two very dzfferent examples of human
behavior: that of a man who pushes a chzld into the water with
the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices
his lzfe in an attempt to save the chzld. Each of these two cases
can be explained with equal ease in Freudian and in Adlerian
terms. According to Freud the first man suffered from repression
(say, ofsome component ofhis Oedipus complex), whzle the second man had achieved sublimation. According to Adler the first
man suffered from feelings ofinferiority (producing perhaps the
need to prove to himself that he dared to commit some crime),
and so did the second man (whose need was to prove to himself
that he dared to rescue the chzld). I could not think ofany human
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16. All the quotes in this paragraph
are from: Karl Popper, "Science:
Conjectures and Refutations ," in
Grim, Science and the Occult, pp.
87 -93 .
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behavior which could not be interpreted in terms ofeither theory .
. . . It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in
fact their weakness.
"Confirmations," he concludes, "should count only if they are the
result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory
in question, we should have expected an event v.:hich was incompatible with the theory-an event which would have refuted the theory. ' '
Sir Karl's insight is an important one, both for the understanding
of what counts as science and to make us aware of a sometimes subtle
kind of (often unintended) intellectual dishonesty-the explanation
which hedges all bets. But the application of his criterion as a means
of distinguishing science from pseudoscience is trickier than one might
suppose . Consider astrology, for example , which Popper believes to fail
his test. In fact, the major tenets of traditional astrology have been
thoroughly tested empirically and falsified . Not even those, such as
Feyerabend and Gauquelin , who think that there may be more connections between celestial events and terrestrial biological systems than
has been commonly supposed, wish to defend any of those traditional
claims . 17 Or, to take another case , the defenders ofVelikovsky have let
a great deal hinge on whether or not hydrocarbons are to be found in
the Venusian atmosphere in sizable concentrations . We now have virtually conclusive evidence that they are not. This deals a heavy blow
to the theory, which shows that the theory is not, by Popper's standard , pseudoscientific . Such cases suggest that the falsifiability criterion
provides at most a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a theory's
being scientific. Of course, one finds the defenders of astrology constantly excusing their failures, and one may expect some die-hard
Velikovskians to modify the master's theory to take away the sting of
the Venusian space probes, but this is more of a comment on partisan
tactics than on the theories themselves. Furthermore, these tactics of
explaining away and of modifying theories to overcome empirical failures
are widely practiced in orthodox science . Whether engaging in these
activities is to be seen as virtuous or vicious depends on many contextual factors . Again , we seem to come down to the judicious assessment
of particular cases.

I

f we cannot swallow Popper's criterion whole, perhaps we can accept a version of it, or some other criterion. After all, one nonswallow doth not a summary dismissal make . To see whether we
are likely to find a viable demarcation principle, we must first provide
a description of the job we would have such a principle perform .
Wanted : demarcation criterion to replace retiring Popperian. Must
be capable not only of distinguishing classical mechanics from
classical astrology , but also of deciding, in a plausible manner ,
hard cases , e.g., whether parapsychology is, or could be , a science.
Objectivity required : Candidates born of wrath and insult need
not apply . Experience not required : Since this is a job with a
future, the candidate must not make factual claims, for time may
prove them wrong. The successful candidate must be free to travel
to any era or area in which science will or could be practiced . For
the reasons just given , only catholic criteria will be employed , even
though we are an equal opportunity employer.
To do such a job , a criterion would have to be purely formal, to

Published by SURFACE, 2013
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guarantee freedom from such accidents of outlook as those which rejected the work of Mendel, Newton, and Darwin, and it would have
to be mechanical in application, so as to preclude subjectivity and special
pleading.
It should be plain that to have such a criterion is to have a theory
of science and that the criterion itself must be doubtful as long as we
lack a rational consensus about what the essential ingredients of science
are. There was a time-the second quarter of the twentieth centurywhen many philosophers of science believed that su~_b a consensus was
at hand. They were the logical positivists, who--saw their movement as
the confluence of two great philosophical streams: the classic empiricism
of David Hume and Ernst Mach,1s and the new mathematical logic of
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead.l9 The union of the two
produced what W. V. Quine was later to call the two dogmas of
empiricism.2o The first dogma was the verifiability principle, which
asserted, roughly speaking, that the meaning of a statement of fact consists iri the way it can be tested. The second was the analytic-synthetic
distinction, according to which every truth-bearing statement must be
either analytic, and thus have its truth or falsity depend entirely on
the meanings of its terms, or else synthetic, and thus have its truth or
falsity depend on matters of fact. Mathematical statements were said
to belong to the first category, and the statements of the empirical
sciences to the second. In an act of ingratitude, philosophy, mother
of the sciences, was cast into the outer darkness of meaninglessness except insofar as she was willing to chasten her pretensions. The Middle
Ages had permitted her to remain as the handmaiden of theology; now
she could remain as the handmaiden of science, her only legitimate
role being to display the beauties of her daughter's logical structure.
Positivism, priding itself on its logical clarity and rigor, set about
casting the principle of verifiability into a rigorous mold. But the mold,
alas, kept breaking: Each formulation of the principle was either too
broad, permitting the acknowledged clear cases of nonsense to be
verifiable, or too narrow, excluding perfectly respectable scientific
endeavors. Furthermore, it proved possible to construct counterexamples
to each formulation with the same clean rigor that the principle itself
was intended to exhibit. 21 (Consider, for instance, the simple question,
Is the verifiability principle itself verifiable?) The search for the
verifiability principle was ultimately abandoned. But note well: The
verifiability principle was to be formal in character, capable of
mechanical application, independent of factual assumptions. It was supposed to have the very characteristics of a successful applicant for the
job of demarcation criterion.

T

he positivist program broke down in other ways as well. That
mathematics could be shown to rest on the meanings of words
became increasingly dubious, and the nature of meaning and
definition themselves came to seem problematic.22 The resolutely
ahistorical representation of science as a set of axiomatizable systems
connected to observation by formalizable confirmation relations began
to crumble under the attacks of a new generation of philosophers of
science who stressed the central role that historical process must play
in our understanding of science.23 It came to be understood that the
norms of appraisal of science have evolved along with science itself, and
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18. Both Hume and Mach wished to
show that the whole of obtainable
human knowledge was founded on
sense experience. Mach's deflationary
analysis of science was very influential
in the thought of the young Einstein.
19. In their monumental Pn"ncipia
Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead
attempted, with considerable but by
no means total success, to derive
classical mathematics from pure logic.
20. W. V. Quine, " Two Dogmas of
Empiricism ," in From a Logical Point
of View (New York: Harper & Row,
1963). pp. 20-46.

21. Cf. C. G. Hempel , "Problems
and Changes in the Empiricist
Criterion of Meaning." Reprinted in
A.). Ayer 's excellent anthology,
Logical Positivism (Glencoe, Ill.: Free
Press, 1959).
22. Kurt Godel's famous incompleteness theorem showed that
mathematics could not be totally axiomatized in the manner envisioned
by Russell and Whitehead . An accessible , informal treatment of Godel' s
theorem is E. Nagel and). R.
Newman, Godel's Proof(New York:
New York University Press, 1958). For
some of the questions about meaning
and definition, see Quine, "Two
Dogmas of Empiricism."
23. Good examples of this approach
are to be found in Imre Lakatos and
Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge (London
and New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1970).
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in the very attempt to develop universal, atemporal standards of science,
positivism had fallen victim to the parochialism it had been bent on
eradicating.
The consensus, then , has come apart, and with it the hope of securely
dividing science from other sorts of things. Child of my own time that
I am, I do not regret relinquishing the attempt to draw the boundaries
firmly. At best, a clear boundary could tell us whether a theory is now
scientific. It could not tell us whether that theory could be developed
in such a way as to make it scientific. If we too zealously pull what we
take to be weeds, we risk failing to improve the garden.

Garbage and goodies

24. The fascinating story of Castaneda
the confidence man is told in Richard
de Mille , Castaneda's j ourney, 2d ed.
(Santa Barbara , Calif.: Capra Press ,
1978). See chap. 4, " What Happened
at UCLA?"
25. The Skeptical Inquirer, vol. 4, no .
2 (Winter 1979-80): 2-3. This
magazine should be read by anyone
interested in the matters discussed in
the present article.

26. Larry Kusche , "The Bermuda
Triangle ," in Abell and Singer,
Science and the Paranormal, pp.
296-309. See esp. p. 308.

27. Nolen , "Psychic Healing," p.
191.
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Our inability to find a rock-ribbed demarcation criterion inevitably
leaves us with borderline cases which are difficult to decide. But that
should not blind us to the plain fact that at least 95 percent of what
one would be intuitively inclined to view as pseudoscience is intellectual garbage and identifiable as such. These are not hard cases; they
can be dismissed by good sense and careful detective work .
We have, for instance , strong and detailed reasons for ignoring the
likes of circle squarers and the amateur inventors of perpetual motion
and antigravity machines. This is not to say that an antigravity machine
might not be constructable (we can say this of perpetual motion
machines), but only to say that it is far less likely that such a machine
could be put together in a basement than that a manned space program could be effectively launched by Andorra .
We may also, on the basis of long and sometimes bitter experience ,
dismiss the claims made by and on behalf of the legion of prophets,
spiritualist mediums, psychic detectives , and clairvoyants who populate
television programs, mass market paperbacks, and your local newspaper,
not to mention such organs of enlightenment as the National Enquirer.
To give some documentable examples : Jeanne Dixon's record as a prophetess is miserable, Uri Geller and Peter Hurkos are frauds (though
clever enough to fool some very intelligent people), Carlos Castaneda
fabricated the Don Juan stories (though he received a still unrevoked
Ph.D. in anthropology from UCLA for one of them) , 24 Dorothy
Allison didn't solve the Atlanta murders, the Amityville Horror is not
a true story (this was established in court), 2s and on and on . In such
cases the only set of phenomena that need explaining are psychological
and sociological (e.g., Why the intense hunger for wonders? Why do
even intelligent people act as if they wanted to be duped?). So theories
which take these sorts of psychic phenomena at face value are likely
to be defective from the start.
In a similar vein, Larry Kusche has shown conclusively that there is
no Bermuda Triangle mystery to be solved, so any attempt to solve it
is off on the wrong foot . For a quick argument, it suffices to notice
that the ratio of disappearances to the volume of ship and air traffic
is no higher in the "Triangle" than in any other region of the world.26
A similar statistical argument casts immediate doubt on the claims of
a faith healer like Katherine Kuhlman. Physicians estimate that 80 percent of diseases and injuries are self-limiting, i.e ., things improve spontaneously. Faith healers claim only a 70 percent cure rate, giving them
a margin of 10 percent .27 And a partial reply to the set of "mysteries"
to which von Daniken's ancient astronaut theory is supposed to supply
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the solution is that many of them, such as the raising of the Easter Island
statues or the erection of the Great Pyramid of Egypt without ropes,
is that they are not mysteries at all: Heyerdahl filmed the transport and
erection of Easter Island statues by the natives, and the ropes are on
display in the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. The simple fact is that von
Daniken willfully ignored the data. The fewer the wonders , the less
need there is for wonderful theories.

B

ut wonders and wonderful theories multiply Medusa-like: Expose the physical medium Eustacia Palladino and up jumps Uri
Geller; debunk DonJuan and prepare to deal with the shroud
of Turin; reveal the quackery of dianetics and watch it metamorphose
into a religion, scientology. In each of these cases, at least one-and
commonly several-scientist of reputation is persuaded that there is gold
to be found, so some other scientists undertake to show that it is only
iron pyrites. The latter scientists are often successful, but nevertheless
there remain many strange and puzzling reports and occurrences for
which nobody has an account which satisfies most of those who are both
informed and dispassionate (on many of these issues, people fitting that
description are not easily found). A man named William Corliss makes
a modest living compiling and selling large volumes of reports of
anomalies drawn entirely from the pages of orthodox, reputable scientific journals such as Nature, Science, journal of Geophysical Research,
American Anthropologist, and the like. These anomalies are reports
of events or objects which appear to be inconsistent with or beyond
the reach of accepted theories. Some of them appear to give aid and
comfort to radical theories, such as Barry Fell's view that there was extensive transoceanic traffic a thousand years before Columbus, or ''scientific creationism,'' while others look as if they are either erroneous or
assimilable by the development of theories of a more orthodox vein .
The number, quality, and variety of anomalies leave no doubt that the
fit between textbooks and facts is a good deal less secure than many
of us have been led to believe.
So how many goodies are there going to be among all that garbage?
If one reads a significant amount of fringe literature with a critical and
informed eye, one encounters a small number of anomalous phenomena
and unusual suggestions for explaining them which seem to merit further investigation. If I were asked for the relative frequency of such
worthwhile subjects for further study in the mass of fringe literature,
I would guess it to be about 5 to 10 percent. This percentage tallies
faily well with another percentage which has remained remarkably stable
over some thirty years of investigation . That is the percentage of all
UFO reports which cannot be pretty conclusively ascribed to some
specific "normal" cause . In other words, after investigation, about 90
percent of UFOs prove to be Identified Flying Objects. 2s What this
percentage and mine have in common is that both are estimates of the
tendency of human beings to misperceive or misrepresent phenomena
which seem to them to be puzzling and emotionally disturbing. If we
take the 10 percent of unresolved cases, it seems plausible to suppose
that at least half of them would be resolvable with more careful investigation or would have been resolvable had additional data been
available. This leaves 5 percent or less as a residue of genuinely puzzling cases. Having exposed the crudity of my reasoning for all to see,

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol4/iss1/2

28. Alan Hendry , The UFO Hand·
book (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday ,
1979 ). Hendry 's book is a model for
field investigations of anomalous
phenomena.
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I invite the reader to supply her own estimate .

Parapsychology: A protoscience?

29. Ruth Reinsel, "Parapsychology:
An Empirical Science," in Grim,
Science and the Occult, pp. 151 - 68.

30. G. R. Price, "Science and the
Supernatural ," Science , 26 August
1955 , 359- 67. C. E. M. Hansel , ESP:
A Scientific Evaluation (New York:
Scribner, 1966).

31. Reinsel, " Parapsychology ," p.
158.
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Whatever the number of worthy cases may be, quite a few of them
appear to be in the domain of psychic phenomena. Scientific investigation of psychic phenomena. began in 1882 with the founding of the
Society for Psychical Research in Britain . Eminent scientists-William
Crookes, Oliver Lodge , Alfred Russel Wallace , William James-were
involved in psychical research from the start. The subjects of study were
spiritualist mediums. The stakes were high: the hope of proving the
existence of life after death and of reconciling the seemingly antithetical
world views of science and religion . In the 1930s,]. B. Rhine shifted
the focus of psychical research , which he rebaptised ''parapsychology,''
to the laboratory investigation of extrasensory perception and
psychokinesis. From the beginning, the field has been marked by suggestive but very sporadically obtainable laboratory results and splashy
feats by psychic "stars" whose feats always prove to be riddled through
with some mixture of fraud, misperception, and bad reporting. Serious
researchers have learned to take anecdotal information as suggestive
rather than evidentiary; it simply contains too many possible sources
of error. Since parapsychology is concerned with cases in which information seems to be transmitted when' 'normal'' channels are blocked,
it is unusually sensitive to undercontrolled circumstances. For this reason,
not only must parapsychological research take place under laboratory
conditions if we are to have any confidence in its results , but those conditions must be more tightly controlled than would commonly be required in much "standard" psychological investigation . A great deal
of laboratory research has been conducted over a fifty-year period, the
bulk of which has not withstood heavy critical scrutiny. Of the rest,
the results have been largely either negative or weakly positive. A few
strongly positive outcomes have been reported, but they have not been
consistently replicable, at least not at a rate which has satisfied critics.
Nevertheless, there has been some replication of results, sufficient to
encourage the handful of competent investigators to continue their
efforts .29
The issue of replication has become central to the field for two reasons.
The first is that as experimental protocols have improved, a few positive
results have been obtained which would seem to satisfy all the previously
stated skeptical objections. In the face of this , some critics, notably
G . R. Price and C. E. M. Hansel ,Jo have maintained that the more
striking positive outcomes could have been obtained by fraudulent
means. This serious charge was not idly made: It has now been conclusively established that two well-known and competent experimenters,
S. G. Soal and W . ]. Levy, had, indeed, faked their results. l 1 Despite
the fact that Levy's deceptions were uncovered by his colleagues and
that fraud is by no means unknown in the recent history of orthodox
science, this cast a cloud of doubt over the field which can be firmly
dispelled only by reproducing positive findings in independent
laboratories .
The second reason for insisting on replicability is that there can be
no science of the phenomena of extrasensorimotor communication until it becomes clear on what variables that communication (if it exists)
depends . Only then will it be possible to formulate clear and falsifiable
theories of the phenomena. Because replicable results require the isola-
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tion and control of relevant variables, they provide a necessary condition of theoretical adequacy.

I

n sum, the outcome of a long period of serious research has been
meagre at best, so the probability that parapsychology will become
a full-blooded scientific subject seems, at the moment, to be small.
But the potential reward seems to be so very large for our understanding of human potential that the expectation value-the product of probability and payoff-might not make the enterprise such a bad bet after
all.
If we can put aside militant skeptics (of whom there are many) and
obdurate believers (of whom there are very many more), parapsychology
seems to be everybody's favorite candidate for aprotoscience, i.e., a
serious branch of study which might become a full-blooded science or
might ultimately be, by consensus of the competent, relegated to the
junk heap. Those who classify parapsychology as a protoscience thereby
conceive the science-pseudoscience dichotomous judgment, it if be
usefully made at all, to be the prerogative of history. Many of them
might prefer to forgo some of the passion that that dichotomy seems
to provoke and to view the boundaries of science as melting into a
shadow, with parapsychology in the penumbra and traditional astrology
and the writings of von Daniken and Charles Berlitz relegated to the
outer darkness.

Is science overlooking something?
Finally, something must be said about the matter that was raised
earlier: Given the set of institutional practices that constitute contemporary science, it is likely that unorthodox nuggets of truth on its fringes
are being overlooked? In approaching such a question, one must
remember that science must endeavor not only to maximize the number
of true statements but also to minimize the number of false ones. And
it's not just a matter of numbers: Science must undertake jointly to
maximize the precision, depth, systematic connection, and importance
of the true statements it generates . Any appraisal of the effectiveness
of scientific institutions must measure them against the totality of their
objectives. Plainly, some trade-offs are inevitable . In the case at hand,
it is important that scientists devote their primary attention to projects
which are likely to be most fruitful and simply ignore the rest . This
immediately gives great weight to work which moves along established
grooves. In consequence, one might expect "safe" ventures to be the
ones which get grants and advance careers . This is largely true, but it
is also true that the highest rewards go to those very bright and lucky
people who take the highest risks and succeed . Some fields, like
theoretical physics, put a considerable premium on innovation.
However, such innovation takes place in a highly structured game which
only the most skilled may play. There no longer seems to be a place
in many scientific pursuits for even the talented amateur.
With all these reasons for conservatism on the part of institutional
science, one might have expected that events on the fringes of science
would be either ignored or harshly treated by the orthodox. Indeed,
this often happens: The wrath of astronomers descended so heavily on
the heads of the firm which originally published Velikovsky's Worlds
in Collision that the senior editor who had accepted the manuscript
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was fired Y Despite unpleasant incidents of this sort, the remarkable
fact is the amount of thoughtful attention that sober scientists have
been paying to fringe phenomena. Granted that the proportion of such
scientists is quite small and that this kind of work is typically undertaken by those whose reputation is already secure, a significant number
of books and articles have appeared with detailed skeptical discussions
of such topics as ''the secret life of plants,'' biorhythms, the shroud
of Turin, Atlantis, human behavior and the phases of the moon, and
dowsing . There now exist two publications, The Skeptical Inquirer and
The Zetetic Scholar, devoted entirely to such questions, although with
rather different editorial attitudes. The American Association for the
Advancement of Science has conducted and published special symposia
on UFOs and Velikovsky and has even granted membership to the Parapsychological Association (though not without continuing dissent).
To what do we owe this response? Doubtless much of it is prompted
by a desire to protect science from what has been perceived as a wave
of irrationality threatening its basis of public support. Some of it is
motivated by a concern to offset the rampant disregard for truth shown
by the media on any ' ' paranormal ' ' subject. (Editors regard such topics
as "human interest" rather than "news" and thus seem to suppose
that checking for accuracy is not required .) Another consideration is
that science should maintain its status as the open marketplace of ideas.
Finally, many scientists are just inquisitive folks .

I

n any large organization embedded in a complex society, there will
be both currents and countercurrents, forces for conservation and
forces for change. Which tendencies dominate will depend on the
overall purposes of the organization and how effectively it is structured
to secure their realization. A monastic order will promote conformity
and redirect or suppress dissent . Science, in contrast , depends for its
success on maintaining a high level of competition and dissent, side
by side with a set of powerful procedures for effecting consensus . There
are rewards for the successful promotion of new ideas; the more radical
the suc-cessful idea, the greater the reward . On the other hand, the more
radical the idea, the lower the probability of success, and there are also
careers to be made by demolishing the ideas of others . What
distinguishes science from most other institutions is that it possesses
unusually effective means for settling disputes. People who read only
textbook accounts are likely to overestimate the effectiveness of those
means and view science as the mere accumulation of solid facts . But
those who look at shorter-term fluctuations of scientific fortunes and
fashions-especially, but by no means exclusively, in applied social
science and medicine-are prone to underestimate the effectiveness of
those means and see the development of science as being little different
from the development of, say, a political order. A longer-term,
historically sensitive outlook will see both perturbation and accumulation . It will see the rejection of science by scientists: Wegener's continental drift, meteorite falls, the conservation of energy . It will also
see science accommodating itself to views it had previously rejected ,
submitting itself to the tribunals of experiment and theoretical clarity.
The famous self-corrective machinery of the institution of science is very
like a flagellant's scourge : a device we have carefully crafted so that
nature may humiliate our presumptions .
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